July 2010: What is a Good Life?
This meeting continued our top-down examination of ethics and morality, following the 23-Jun-10 discussion "What is the Meaning of Life?". Roger Collinge introduced the topic "What is a Good Life?", drawing particularly on the book The Choice of Hercules - Pleasure, Duty and the Good Life in the 21st Century by AC Grayling.
We first discussed whether any useful distinction could be drawn between the phrases "The Good Life" and "A Good Life". For some, "The Good Life" means a life of comfort and pleasure, mainly focussed on the self, whilst "A Good Life" means a life more concerned with spiritual values, relationships and the welfare of others. As labels, the two terms therefore draw a useful distinction. It also implies that there may be many ways of leading a good life.
Roger explained that Grayling’s book draws on a long tradition of philosophers from Plato to Sartre. It is in three parts. The first, The Individual Good, sets the scene and context in which he discusses his theme. The second, Practical Morality, addresses matters such as "Family Values", sex, drugs, death, religion and reason. The third part, Society, deals with civility and civil society, human rights, wars and war crimes.
After Roger’s introduction, we had a free-flowing discussion which ranged over several of the issues he had raised. Some points to draw out are as follows: we should (at least) avoid harm to others; more positively, our friendship, intimacy and relationships can nurture other individuals; our individual moral development is a process which is never complete (like education, of which it may be part); falling short of an ethical ideal can cause us to feel guilt (we talked much about managing regret, remorse and guilt); happiness is more a by-product of a good life, rather than a goal in itself; it is not selfish to enjoy such happiness; our multi-cultural society (and world) call for tolerance, but we each need to decide the limits of our own tolerance (eg of polygamy, the French legislation on the burka, and the Afghan situation); and the role of Character (personal virtues) and Conduct (behaviour) in living a good life.
An issue we did not have time to explore was to identify the sources of our morality, so we decided to discuss that at our 11-Aug-10 meeting. Then, on 08-Sep-10 we will take a bottom-up look at ethical issues, by discussing "Everyday Ethics".
David Silk
June 2010: What is the Meaning of Life?
Philosophers have wrestled with this question over millenia but few firm conclusions have ever been reached. It is not surprising therefore that the Philosophy Group meeting on 23 June failed also to provide the final answer, but we did have a very stimulating discussion, and probably our most demanding session so far.
David Silk introduced the session by attempting to direct us towards some proper philosopher’s disciplines. This included analysing the words in the question so that we understood their definition and intended meaning. This is very important because, as we found later, misunderstandings creep in if our use of language is too loose. This can in some cases, and nearly did on the day, result in unintended offence to the sensibilities of some members.
David then broke the process down further into two key questions;
Q1: "Does life intend to convey a meaning to us?" The Yes and No views.
Q2: "Do we draw significance from life as we experience it?" The Yes and No views.
And he went on to present "The Four Possible Viewpoints". He said that it seems that people can (and do) adopt all four ways of answering those two questions:
# The Yes-Yes view. A traditional religious view? For example, the catechism of the Roman Catholic church has as its first heading "The life of man - to know and love God", and continues "God draws close to man. He calls man to seek him, to know him, to love him with all his strength." Sigmund Freud (1856-1939): "The question of the purpose of human life has been raised countless times: it has never received a satisfactory answer and perhaps does not admit of one... Once again, only religion can answer the question of the purpose of life. One can hardly be wrong in concluding that the idea of life having a purpose stands and falls with the religious system."
# The Yes-No view. An inconsistent stance? This may mean we think there is a meaning to life, but are too busy to do anything about it, or feel our our lives are too insignificant to bother. Or we may hold a Deist view (there was a creator-God with a purpose, but who has no active involvement with the world now). Or a similar view about purposeful-Nature.
# The No-Yes view. The humanist/pragmatic view? We might deny an overarching purpose for life, yet choose to decide the purpose of our own life. One way is to live "as-if" there were intended meaning in life, respecting the value of myth, and the mystical or religious story. Terry Eagleton (The Meaning of Life, 2007): "If our lives have meaning, it is something with which we manage to invest them, not something with which they come ready equipped... Maybe fictions and myths are not just errors to be dispelled, but productive illusions which allow us to thrive... Such mythologies may not be true from a scientific viewpoint. But perhaps we have made too much of a fuss of scientific truth, assuming that is the only brand of truth around." Richard Dawkins (The God Delusion, 2006): "We can give up belief in God while not losing touch with a treasured [religious] heritage." "The truly adult view... is that our life is as meaningful, as full and as wonderful as we choose to make it. And we can make it very wonderful indeed." Don Cupitt (in What Philosophers Think, Continuum, 2003): "But surely you can believe in something without thinking that that thing actually exists. To believe in something is to be committed to a particular policy or programme, for life. Why do people assume that belief-in means belief-that? Belief -in implies moral commitment. But it doesn’t have to imply ontological commitment." "So I don’t think any religious views are literally true, but I think they’re all existentially or morally useful, or a great many of them are."
# The No-No view. The hard-line rationalist view? We might consider that we are in a cold, indifferent universe, and must seek our own consolation (of pleasure, beauty, logic, science...even philosophy!). Bertrand Russell (1872-1970): "Even if the open windows of science at first make us shiver after the cosy indoor warmth of traditional humanizing myths, in the end the fresh air brings vigour, and the great spaces have a splendour of their own." Albert Camus (1913-1960): "Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy." Julian Baggini (Guardian 28-Apr-10): French thinkers such as Camus and Sartre recognised the absurdity of life, but it took the English ‘Pythons’ to show that the right response is to laugh at it."
It was interesting that our subsequent discussions gave us no agreed conclusion but developed a number of key themes, the most common of which were;
·that those with a strong religious belief and had made "a leap of faith" were more confident that they had found a real meaning to their lives,
·while many others declared that they had found no such answer but believed that their quest gave their lives a purpose,
·and yet others believed that "life is what it is" and that no further meaning was necessary.
Chris Bisco
May 2010: What is a Person
Roger Crawley introduced this discussion. He had circulated various comments from philosophers and others on the subject before the meeting and referred to those quotations during his introduction. He also referred to various texts he had consulted.
He talked about various perceptions of identity and aspects of personality such as behaviour, demeanour and temperament. He suggested that the starting point could come from psychology. Others later suggested that psychological changes, perhaps brought about by what is called mental illness, meant that a physical definition of what is a person might be better.
On the psychological front Roger referred to, inter alia, ego, the ‘id’, the psyche (mind or soul), selfhood and persona i.e. how an individual presents him or her self to the world.
He raised the question of what is innate in each human being and therefore common to us all and therefore not a part of the definition of what is one person as against another. This could be said to be part of the continuing debate as to how much the various aspects of our characters are derived from nature as against nurture.
He referred to various philosophers who had argued that certain aspects of what we are were ‘hard wired’ i.e. a genetic inheritance and not something we can choose. Examples are language, a universal grammar - which is perhaps the same thing- and a sense of morality. Against this last idea should be put the thought that perhaps what we normally perceive as altruism may on occasion be a more sophisticated form of selfishness such as deferring to the wishes of the group if that will, indirectly, better further our aims.
Another example was thought to be the instinct of caring for babies, but this was doubted from experience. It was suggested that inherent traits may exist but that they may, on occasion, be overridden, making the determination of what is inherent very difficult.
The idea was also put forward that genetics could eventually affect personality in that, for example, as the male of the species is generally the stronger it was the men who had the role of hunting in early societies. Successful hunting requires aggression and thus eventually such a characteristic could, in many cases, be inherent in men.
One case put strongly was that what defined us were the ideas and memories we had, which made us different from the next person and by this means defined what we were.
There was a debate as to what is a ‘normal’ person, and, surprisingly for a debate on philosophy, common agreement was arrived at in the conclusion that there was a broad and continuous rage of characteristics all of which could be considered normal.
We were concerned as to how homo sapiens differed from other species. Characteristics such as self awareness and emotion were considered.
The point was also raised as to what is essential in the definition of being human in that it is easy to conceive of highly intelligent robots with many human characteristics.
Contributions were made by all present and, in my opinion, a very interesting and enjoyable debate held.
R A Collinge
April 2010: What is knowledge
“What is knowledge?” was the central question of the 07-Apr-10 meeting. Jim Pottinger introduced the topic giving us a framework for discussion. We were considering propositional knowledge, “knowing that” rather than “knowing how”. Jim was expanding on the traditional philosophical account of knowledge, and in this context knowledge is “justified true belief”.
Jim then discussed belief in its different forms: “believing in” and “believing that”. Belief involves trust and sometimes emotion and hope. Ethics and faith are also part of the picture. Belief has to be justified, which involves evidence and Jim briefly outlined sources of evidence – personal experience, reference to others via books etc, things that are culturally known and “common sense”.
There was then a discussion by the whole group exploring these ideas. The discussion was varied and stimulating with contributions from the whole group:
- Empirical knowledge is falsifiable
- Scientific knowledge proceeds by small or large adjustments- the world is no longer thought to be flat
- Knowledge is needed for guiding our actions
- Knowing is not passive – it is not a simple act of assent
- Knowledge is not absolute it is subject to change
- Self knowledge was introduced, but this is the subject of the 05-May-10 meeting "What is a person?"
This is just a brief outline of the discussion. Hopefully everyone gained from it. I personally will use the words "I know" a lot more carefully; also I now am aware of how little one truly "knows".
But the quote of the day was from Jim "Philosophers spend a lot of time discussing things that don’t matter." This does not apply to the discussion of knowledge!
Catherine Ross
March 2010: Our Approach to Philosophy
The objective for our 03-Mar-10 meeting was to agree the framework around which we would conduct our future discussions. We focused on three main questions:
- What can be regarded as philosophy and what can not?
- How should we conduct ourselves to make our discussions more effective and to ensure that all who want to be heard can be heard?, and
- What will be the subjects for our meetings in the immediate future?
Our first task was to introduce ourselves and the varied backgrounds which informed and influenced our approach to life in general and to our interest in philosophy in particular. It became clear that the nineteen members present had a very wide and rich range of knowledge and experience drawn from life in many professional disciplines and cultures. From that, in turn, sprang the realisation that we would all benefit from hearing different perspectives on the subjects we would cover in future discussions.
We struggled, however, to distinguish “philosophy” from any other academic discipline or mode of discussion. After some time and much vigorous debate we concluded that we needn't be too formulaic and it was not necessary to boil down definitions into a restricted framework. The subject we chose to discuss would create its own natural framework and scope for discussion. We could take a broad view and cover any interesting field that we found stimulating and that challenged our capacity to understand the issues and their impact on our lives.
Further discussion about the manner in which we should conduct our discussions led to the conclusion that we should rely simply on the common courtesies of normal debate. In particular we should all take care to listen out for others who were attempting to express a point but might struggle to be heard over our more vigorous speakers and be prepared to give way for them. It was agreed that we did need a chair or “referee” for each meeting; that it should be a different person each time; but that only those who wished to volunteer should take the chair. The chair would summarise our debate at the end of each meeting but this should not be taken as a critical review of our “progress”.
We also agreed that it would be best that each session should be introduced by a short, but prepared, briefing on the subject of the day setting out the main points at issue, and the reported views of those who had considered it before. Members would be asked to prepare briefings for each meeting according to their interest in the relevant topic and their willingness to do so.
Chris Bisco
February 2010: The Limitations of Language
On 03-Feb-10 we had a lively discussion on ‘The Limitations of Language’. This arose from our look at Wittgenstein on 14-Oct-09 (see report below). In his early work he had said there was an aspect of reality (the ‘noumenal’) of which we cannot speak meaningfully. We therefore asked ourselves whether there are aspects of our experience which are literally beyond words. Some types of thinking are done without words, although perhaps afterwards we can put them into words. Some perceptions (e.g. smell, colour) can only be described by indirect reference. Our emotional response to works of art (paintings, sculpture, music, etc) can be difficult to describe, and impossible to explain.
We discussed the power of different languages, and the cultural context in which they are used. This was seen as a limitation on their effectiveness in different areas of discourse, as well as giving problems for translation. Members described their practical experience of this. The formal notations of logic and mathematics are a way of overcoming these problems, provided we adhere to agreed usage and definitions.
We touched on the use of metaphor, especially in poetry. There is a view that metaphor can convey deeper truths and experience than can be conveyed in literal language.
Overall, I think we agreed that there are important limitations to language. Our difficulty in articulating some of them is itself evidence of that proposition!
David Silk
December 2009: 20th Century Philosophy - 2 (Existentialism, French philosophy, Popper)
On 02-Dec-09 we completed our historical review of philosophy by looking at three topics from the 20th century: Existentialism (especially Husserl (1859-1938) and Heidegger (1889-1976)); Bergson (1859-1941) and recent French philosophy; and Popper (1902-1994). They were concerned, broadly, with finding a meaning and purpose to life, and to handling uncertainty in the emerging science and politics of a turbulent century.
Existentialism had been started by Kierkegaard (1813-1855), and had given rise to both Christian and humanist versions. It stressed the moral importance of the individual human; by our decision-making we create and become ourselves. In Germany, Husserl founded phenomenology, which studied the conscious experiences we have in life (these, at least, are certain even if we cannot be sure of the nature of wider existence). These ideas were developed by Heidegger, who was a pupil of Husserl and succeeded him in the chair of philosophy at Freiburg. His main work was published in 1927: Being and Time. He concluded that the most important aspects of our mode of being correspond to past, present and future thus ‘being is time’. Life is social, but meaningless and absurd (unless we allocate meaning ourselves). Heidegger became a Nazi, and repudiated Husserl; this undermined his reputation.
After World War 2, Paris became the centre of existentialist thought, which became widely influential. It was seen within a general literary culture, without the emphasis on science, logic and analysis seen in the English-speaking world. Bergson provided the intellectual base; he saw human beings in evolutionary terms, with a life-force, or élan vital, which drives us to greater individuality or complexity. These ideas were taken up by writers and philosophers: Sartre, Camus and Merleau-Ponty. Later, in the 1960s, structuralism became fashionable; it viewed any discourse as merely a structure in language, which could be analysed or ‘deconstructed’ in those terms. Many English-speaking philosophers found this approach merely rhetorical, appealing to those not used to logical analysis.
Popper was very different. He addressed the philosophy of science, following Einstein’s revolutionary theories of relativity (1905, 1915). These had overturned the old certainties associated with Newton’s Laws. In 1937 he was exiled from Vienna to New Zealand, and after the War came to the London School of Economics, where he devoted himself to his writing until his death in 1994. Popper saw scientific ‘laws’ as mere tentative theories. Theories are useful until they come up against limits, when they must be revised or replaced; thus certainty is not available. Theories cannot be proved, only disproved; thus criticism is the chief means of progress; a statement which no observation could falsify (e.g. ‘God exists’) cannot count as scientific. His main publications were: 1934 The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959 in English); and 1945 The Open Society and Its Enemies. The latter applied the same principles to the social sciences: the imposition of a single viewpoint is never justified; criticism is the chief way in which social policies can be improved; this happens in an ‘open society’ where critical discussion and opposition are allowed; we engage in perpetual problem-solving, to remove the worst, rather than aiming for the (uncertain) best. Popper was a strong critic of Marxism.
This meeting concluded our historical review of philosophy, based on Bryan Magee’s book The Story of Philosophy (2001). From January 2010 we start having monthly discussion-style meetings.
David Silk
October 2009: 20th Century Philosophy - 1 (Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein)
On 14-Oct-09 we held the first of two meetings on 20th-Century Philosophy. The century was dominated by academic philosophers; this resulted in massive developments in logical analysis and linguistic analysis. Also, the developments of science caused the nature of knowledge to be reconsidered, and an increasingly secular view caused a re-examination of the human condition, and human purpose and morality. In this meeting, we looked at: Frege (1848-1925) and modern logic; Russell (1872-1970) and analytic philosophy; and Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and linguistic philosophy.
From the time of Aristotle, logic had been concerned with the process of human thinking and knowledge. Now it was seen as having an objective existence independent of human thought. Frege enlarged the scope of logic to embrace mathematics, and base both upon simple logical premises. He reached a stage where Russell pointed out a fundamental problem (now known as Russell’s Paradox, about self-referential statements). Russell continued the work until 1913, but was influenced by his new student Wittgenstein to see language as the key to understanding both mathematics and logic. The analysis of language then became a major theme of philosophy, in England, and with the Vienna Circle (who were dispersed to the USA and England in 1938). This led to logical positivism, which rejected assertions which could not be subjected to empirical verification. Russell eventually felt that linguistic analysis was a diversion from philosophy’s main task of understanding the nature of the reality external to ourselves.
Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein all interacted with each other, being concerned with mathematics, logic and language. In our meeting we had a useful discussion of some of the issues arising from their work. Finally, we discussed how the Group will operate from 2010; we shall meet monthly, to discuss a topic chosen at the previous meeting.
David Silk
August 2009: Democracy and Philosophy (Utilitarians, and the American Pragmatists)
On 19-Aug-09 we started with a recap of philosophy since 1600, as we had studied it so far. Having concentrated on continental European philosophers for five meetings, we returned to British philosophers, who had been developing moral and political ideas based on Locke’s concept of liberty. So, our theme was Democracy and Philosophy. The English ‘Utilitarians’ Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) formulated and developed the ideas of “the greatest good of the greatest number” and “everybody is to count for one, and nobody for more than one”. This liberal approach was in sharp contrast to the ideas developed by German philosophers from the 1780s to the 1880s. Secondly we looked at the American ‘Pragmatists’ CS Peirce (1839-1914), William James (1842-1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952). They developed a distinctive liberal tradition of philosophy in the USA, which, from 1776, had become the first ‘democracy’ for 2000 years (since the city-states of ancient Greece). Their impact on politics, public policy and education was immense, across the world.
Finally, we discussed some ideas for the working of the Group after we complete our historical review of philosophy, in Dec-09. A majority of the Group wished to meet monthly from Jan-2010, and this has now been arranged.
David Silk
June 2009:German Philosophy -3 (Marx, Nietzsche)
On 17Jun 09 we concluded our study of the seven major German philosophers active between the 1780s and 1880s, by looking at Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). We also considered how the Group will move forward after it completes its historical review of philosophy, at the end of 2009.
Both Marx and Nietzsche based their work on the philosophy of Hegel (see the Report of our 22 Apr 09 meeting). Hegel had identified the changing nature of reality; he believed the world was evolving towards a final, perfect state (represented politically by the the Prussian monarchy, and philosophically by his own work). Karl Marx interpreted Hegel’s ideas in terms of material development only, with an emphasis on the means of production and the related class-conflict. He believed that only one more step (the revolution) was needed to achieve the ideal harmonious world. Events proved him wrong on that, but his influence has been immense. Friedrich Nietzsche also focused on the real world of phenomena, and eventually rejected Kant and Shopenhauer’s view of the ‘noumenal’ world. He believed the decline of religion had highlighted a need for a morality based on philosophical principles. The morality he offered was elitist; the ‘will to power’ enabled natural leaders to excel, even at the expense of the weak. His views have been misrepresented as supporting German nationalism. Overall, the seven German philosophers active from the 1780s to 1880s established a firmer academic basis for philosophy and moved the subject forward at a time when science was making remarkable advances, notably about evolution.
David Silk
April 2009: German Philosophy - 2 (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel)
Following our 11-Feb-09 digression into the religions of East and West (see Report below), on 22-Apr-09 we continued our study of the seven major German philosophers active between the 1780s and the 1880s. We looked at Fichte (1762-1814), Schelling (1775-1854) and Hegel (1770-1831). All three based their approach on the work of the major philosopher Kant (see the report of our 03-Dec-08 meeting, below).
Fichte took an extreme Idealist view; he thought all reality consists in its moral character, and that we create our own empirical world as a realm for moral self-fulfilment. His views were adopted by theists and atheists, but his more lasting impact was as one of the founder-philosophers of German nationalism.
Schelling was quite different. He produced several philosophical systems, but the most influential was his ‘Philosophy of Nature’. He saw all life as a creation of Nature, which is continuously developing; this anticipated Darwin’s idea of evolution. The creativity of Nature culminates in man’s creative arts, which lead to greater self-awareness. These ideas appealed to the emerging Romantic Movement. In England, ST Coleridge quoted Schelling extensively (often without attribution).
Hegel was the most important philosopher of the three. He saw reality as a developing unity, of what he called (in German) ‘Geist’. In English this means something between ‘mind’ and ‘spirit’. This development leads to a unified and harmonious self-awareness which Hegel called ‘The Absolute’. This quasi-religious view was linked, for Hegel, with a Christian belief; but for others it offered a secular view. Hegel formalised the process of historical development in what he called ‘the dialectic’. This comprises: an initial view (thesis) whose inadequacies become apparent; a counter-proposal (antithesis) which addresses these inadequacies; and from these two a combination with the best features of each (synthesis). This synthesis then becomes the thesis for the next cycle of development. Thus reality itself is continuously evolving, and can be understood rationally by the dialectic. As individuals we live in a particular ‘Zeitgeist’ (spirit of the time). Hegel saw his own philosophy as the culmination of this historical process; in the political and social arena, he saw the Prussian monarchy as having almost achieved the harmonious ideal. Hegel was so influential that his successors comprised two groups: Right Hegelians formed the basis of German nationalism, and Left Hegelians (notably Marx) felt further change was necessary. Strangely, Hegel thus came to be seen as the intellectual grandfather of both Nazism and Communism.
David Silk
February 2009: East and West (Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism)
On 11 February 09 we looked at the mutual influence of ideas from the East and West. This followed naturally from our examination of Kant and Schopenhauer on 3 December 08 (see Report below). Schopenhauer, following the Western tradition of philosophy, had arrived at ideas remarkably similar to those of Eastern religions, especially Hinduism and Buddhism. We looked at three religions, from the outside and from a philosophical perspective. Christianity provides the religious and cultural background to much of the development of Western philosophy. It is the second of three monotheistic faiths which trace their roots back to Abraham (the others being Judaism and Islam). We noted the philosophical difficulties about their mutual compatibility, and of the idea of an omniscient, omnipotent and all-loving God. This leads to many different styles of Christian belief, but the mainstream idea is that the individual soul has a linear progression through life to some form of immortality.
We then looked at Hinduism and Buddhism, which are much older faiths and are closely related. Hinduism has many Gods, which relate to different aspects of life. Buddhism is not dogmatic about a deity, and concentrates more on a Law of Life. Both faiths believe in reincarnation – with the opportunity for an individual to move towards a state of enlightenment, before being absorbed into the universal One (like a drop of water into the ocean). The Eastern idea is that the individual should rise above the cravings of the physical world, to enter a more blessed state. This links with Kant and Schopenhauer’s idea of the world of (perceived) phenomena, and the world of (unperceivable) noumena. The individual soul has a cyclic progression through a sequence of lives, but does not achieve immortality. Few Western philosophers since Pythagoras and Plato have believed in reincarnation.
Finally, we had a general discussion about the issues raised, and the impact of religion on philosophy.
David Silk
December 2008: German Philosophy - 1 (Kant, Schopenhauer)
On 03-Dec-08 we turned to the golden century of German philosophy,which lasted from the 1780s to the 1880s. It was based mainly in the German universities, which now emphasised the generating of new knowledge as well as the preserving of old knowledge. We looked first at Kant (1724-1804), who many regard as one of most influential philosophers of all time. He brought together the disparate strands of earlier ideas into a single intellectual framework. He believed that there is one aspect of reality which our bodily apparatus (brain and senses) can apprehend; this is the scientific world of space, time and causality. However, there is another aspect of reality which contains what our bodily apparatus cannot apprehend; here, for example, is our freewill, which would otherwise be subject to the deterministic laws of science. Kant felt that this ‘noumenal’ world gave a rational basis for some of the ideas of religion and ethical duty.
Secondly, we looked at Schopenhauer (1788-1860). He accepted most of Kant’s work, but extended and (he felt) corrected it. He was very pessimistic about the world of experience, and felt that the noumenal world was more important. We can experience it only indirectly, through our own life-force or will, and also through aesthetic experience (especially music). He believed the noumenal world was One (singular), and this explained our natural compassion or empathy with other humans. He saw such compassion as the basis for ethics, whereas Kant had seen it as duty and reason. Schopenhauer found, late on, that his ideas of the noumenal world of the One had close similarities with Eastern religions like Hinduism and Buddhism.
David Silk
October 2008: Revolutionary French Thinkers (Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau)
On 22-Oct-08 we looked at the revolutionary French thinkers: Voltaire, Diderot and Rousseau. They were contemporaries, all living in the period 1694-1784. Voltaire and Diderot were French and received a formal education from the Jesuits. Rousseau was born in Geneva, converted to Roman Catholicism to live in Paris then reconverted to Calvinism to return to Geneva. He had a turbulent childhood, with no formal education. Voltaire and Rousseau both had periods of exile in England, where they assimilated the new science (represented by Newton) and the new liberal political theory (represented by Locke). Essentially, all three became great communicators of these new ideas, within France and more widely. Voltaire was the leading French playwright for 50 years; they all contributed to the seminal 35-volume French Encyclopaedia; and they all suffered persecution for their ideas, which upset both church and state. However, The Enlightenment which they started set the scene, and provided the inspiration, for the French Revolution from 1789. Rousseau’s ideas of the Social Contract (where the general will of the people can be imposed on all individual citizens) contrast with the liberalism in Britain, and (some feel) became the basis for later totalitarianism.
David Silk
August 2008: The Great Empiricists - 2 (Hume, Burke)
Our 20-Aug-08 meeting was the third to look at the Rationalists (Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz) and the Empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Burke). They all lived in the period 1596-1797, which brought revolutions in scientific thought and in political structures. The Rationalists sought a deductive approach to knowledge, arguing logically from general principles to particular cases. Their arguments all depended, in part, on some concept of God. The Empiricists sought an inductive approach to knowledge, arguing from particular facts about the world to general principles. The trouble with induction is that you can never be certain of your result (all swans are white, until you find a black one!). The Empiricists were also concerned with the practical world of politics and economics; they adopted a pragmatic approach, recognising the limitations of philosophical reasoning. Burke also developed our ideas of aesthetics, leading to a shift from Classicism to Romanticism. We see this in art, literature and poetry.
David Silk